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SEAMEN, RAILROAD EMPLOYEES, AND UBER DRIVERS?: 
APPLYING THE SECTION 1 EXEMPTION IN THE FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION ACT TO RIDESHARE DRIVERS
Conor Bradley*
ABSTRACT
Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or the Act) exempts “seamen, 
railroad employees, [and] any other class of workers engaged in foreign or 
interstate commerce” from arbitration. In 2019, the Supreme Court held in New 
Prime Inc. v. Oliveira that this provision exempted independent contractors as 
well as employees. This decision expanded the reach of the section 1 exemption and 
may affect the relationship between ridesharing companies, such as Uber, and 
their drivers. Previously, ridesharing companies argued that courts must enforce 
the arbitration clauses in their employment contracts because their workers were 
independent contractors and, therefore, section 1 was inapplicable. Since this 
argument is now prohibited by the holding in New Prime, rideshare drivers have 
an opportunity to avoid arbitration using the section 1 exemption. But they still 
face legal difficulties because of the narrow construction of the exemption employed 
by courts. This Note argues that the current interpretation of the exemption, which 
focuses on the physical movement of goods across state lines, is incongruent with 
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INTRODUCTION
The “sharing” (or “platform”) economy—the system that utilizes 
online platforms to connect laborers and sellers with consumers 
and buyers—has drastically changed the business landscape.1 This 
disruption has come with significant legal and regulatory challeng-
es for the companies operating within the platform economy, their 
employees, and lawmakers. For example, ridesharing companies2
have radically altered the transportation industry,3 but also faced 
scrutiny regarding the way their business models avoid traditional 
1. Brett Harris, Note, Uber, Lyft, and Regulating the Sharing Economy, 41 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 269, 269 (2017).
2. “Ridesharing” is defined as “a car service that allows a person to use a smartphone 
app to arrange a ride in a usually privately owned vehicle.” Ridesharing, DICTIONARY.COM,
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/ridesharing (last visited Oct. 14, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/E985-4XRP]. The rideshare industry in the United States is dominated 
by Uber and Lyft. See Rani Molla, Lyft Has Eaten into Uber’s U.S. Market Share, New Data Suggest,
VOX (Dec. 18, 2018, 11:36 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/12/12/18134882/lyft-uber-
ride-car-market-share [https://perma.cc/HT8Q-58KN] (explaining that in 2018 Uber and 
Lyft comprised 98% of the consumer rideshare market in the United States). Driven by 
these two companies, the industry has grown substantially since its inception in the early 
2010s. One study found that the number of Uber drivers in mid-2012 was basically zero; by 
2015 there were 465,000 drivers employed by Uber. Katherine G. Abraham, John 
Haltiwanger, Kristin Sandusky & James Spletzer, The Rise of the Gig Economy: Fact or Fiction,
109 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 357, 359 (2019).
3. See Meet the 2018 CNBC Disruptor 50 Companies, CNBC (May 22, 2018, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/22/meet-the-2018-cnbc-disruptor-50-companies.html 
[https://perma.cc/H4DB-2LB4] (ranking Uber as number two and Lyft as number five on a 
list of the fifty companies whose innovations are changing the world).
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workplace laws.4 Indeed, numerous plaintiffs have sued Uber, one 
of the leading ridesharing platforms, alleging that the company 
misclassified its drivers as independent contractors, rather than 
employees, to avoid paying them minimum wage and providing 
certain benefits.5
By classifying their workers as independent contractors, Uber 
and other ridesharing companies also took advantage of an expan-
sive application of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or the Act), 
the federal law governing the enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments, to avoid litigating their disputes in court.6 Employment 
contracts between rideshare platforms and their drivers often in-
clude provisions that settle disputes through private arbitration ra-
ther than the court system.7 Agreements to arbitrate employment 
disputes are generally enforceable in both federal and state court 
under the FAA.8 However, section 1 of the Act exempts “contracts 
of employment of seamen, railroad employees, [and] any other 
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”9
Rideshare companies had, sometimes successfully, argued that 
their workers did not qualify under this exemption because they 
are independent contractors and therefore do not operate under 
4. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Kennedy, Employed by an Algorithm: Labor Rights in the On-Demand 
Economy, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 987, 989 (2017).
5. Megan Rose Dickey, Uber Agrees to Pay Drivers $20 Million to Settle Independent Contract 
Lawsuit, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 12, 2019, 12:17 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/03
/12/uber-agrees-to-pay-drivers-20-million-to-settle-independent-contractor-lawsuit [https://
perma.cc/B9J2-6N4V]. Suits have also been filed against other platform economy compa-
nies such as Amazon, GrubHub, Lyft, DoorDash, and Postmates. Id.
6. At the time it was drafted and passed, the FAA was known as the United States Arbi-
tration Act. See Matthew W. Finkin, “Workers’ Contracts” Under the United States Arbitration Act: 
An Essay in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282, 282 (referring to the Act 
as the United States Arbitration Act). For clarity’s sake, however, this Note will uniformly 
refer to the law as the Federal Arbitration Act.
7. For example, Uber uses an arbitration clause in its employment contract. See Capri-
ole v. Uber Techs., Inc., 460 F. Supp. 3d 919, 923–26 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (quoting language 
from the arbitration agreement contained in Uber’s employment contracts). As a result, 
more than 60,000 Uber drivers have filed arbitration claims against the company. Joel Ros-
enblatt, Uber Gambled on Driver Arbitration and Might Have Come Up the Loser, L.A. TIMES 
(May 8, 2019, 10:22 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-uber-ipo-arbitration-
miscalculation-20190508-story.html [https://perma.cc/EAY3-6J8V]. Partly because of the 
increased prevalence of arbitration agreements in standard form employment contracts, the 
House of Representatives passed a bill in September 2019 that would invalidate all arbitra-
tion agreements contained in employment contracts. Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal 
Act, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. (2019).
8. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984) (“To confine the scope of the 
Act to arbitrations sought to be enforced in federal courts would frustrate what we believe 
Congress intended to be a broad enactment appropriate in scope to meet the large prob-
lems Congress was addressing.”).
9. 9 U.S.C. § 1. This Note will refer to this provision as “the exemption,” “the section 1 
exemption,” and “the transportation worker exemption.”
528 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 54:2
“contracts of employment.”10 But the Supreme Court in New Prime 
Inc. v. Oliveira foreclosed this argument by holding that the FAA’s
section 1 exemption included independent contractors.11
In light of New Prime, if rideshare drivers are “workers engaged
in . . . interstate commerce,” they qualify for the exemption.12 But 
the Supreme Court has held that this provision only applies to 
“transportation workers.”13 And most lower courts have adopted a 
narrow definition of this term that excludes rideshare drivers, cre-
ating a legal hurdle for these workers even after New Prime.14
This Note argues that courts should adopt a broader definition 
of “transportation worker” that includes rideshare drivers within 
the section 1 exemption. Part I provides a general overview of the
FAA’s history as it relates to the exemption. Part II more specifical-
ly analyzes the doctrinal development of the section 1 exemption 
and concludes that the narrow construction of the statutory lan-
guage unnecessarily excludes rideshare drivers. Part III proposes a 
broader interpretation that includes rideshare drivers and aligns 
the exemption with the text and legislative history of the FAA.
I. HISTORY OF THE SECTION 1 EXEMPTION
Section 2 of the FAA, the law’s main substantive provision, 
makes written arbitration agreements in contracts “evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce . . . valid, irrevocable and enforce-
able . . . .”15 The Supreme Court has explained that the FAA re-
10. See, e.g., Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., 939 F.3d 210, 217 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining that 
Uber had previously argued that its agreement with their driver was not a contract of em-
ployment).
11. 139 S. Ct. 532, 541 (2019). In 2020, California voters passed Proposition 22 which 
exempts Uber and Lyft from Assembly Bill 5—a California law that reclassified rideshare 
drivers as employees. Sara Ashley O’Brien, Prop 22 Passes in California, Exempting Uber and Lyft
from Classifying Drivers as Employees, CNN BUS. (Nov. 4, 2020, 4:02 PM), https://www.
cnn.com/2020/11/04/tech/california-proposition-22/index.html [https://perma.cc
/P9FD-3E4U]. Thus, in California at least, Uber and Lyft may continue to classify their driv-
ers as independent contractors. Id. While this development certainly matters in determining 
the benefits to which rideshare drivers are entitled, whether rideshare drivers are classified 
as independent contractors or employees is inconsequential for the purposes of the section 
1 exemption because New Prime held that both independent contractors and employees 
were covered by the exemption. 139 S. Ct. at 541.
12. See 139 S. Ct. at 541, 544 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 1).
13. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
14. See infra Sections II.A.3, II.B.
15. 9 U.S.C. § 2; see also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Contr. Corp., 460 U.S. 
1, 24 (1983). More fully, section 2 states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a trans-
action involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising 
out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, 
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quires courts to resolve disputes about the scope of an arbitration 
agreement in favor of arbitration.16 Despite this, section 1 of the 
FAA, which generally defines terms relevant to the Act, states that 
“nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment 
of seaman, railroad employees, or any other class of workers en-
gaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”17 This clause exempts 
certain contracts from the FAA, prohibiting arbitration in those 
contexts.
Section I.A traces the historical underpinnings of the FAA and 
the insertion of the exemption into the Act. Section I.B provides a 
brief summary of the main Supreme Court jurisprudence inter-
preting the FAA to place the subsequent discussion of the section 1 
exemption in Parts II and III in context.
A. Legislative History of the Section 1 Exemption
At the turn of the twentieth century, arbitration was a common 
practice in the United States.18 Nevertheless, arbitration encoun-
tered various legal obstacles during this period.19 The most im-
portant weakness of the law governing early arbitration was its “rel-
ative lack of enforceability of . . . agreements before an award was 
made.”20 Courts considered agreements to arbitrate future disputes 
revocable at any time.21 This meant that courts “would not stay [a 
judicial] action or suit pending arbitration,” even if the parties had 
previously agreed to arbitrate the dispute.22
As arbitration became more prevalent, reformers pushed for 
statutory remedies to combat this “rule of revocability” pertaining 
to agreements to arbitrate future disputes.23 In 1920, New York be-
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract.
9 U.S.C. § 2.
16. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24–25. Indeed, the Court has explained that 
the FAA “declare[s] a national policy favoring arbitration.” Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 
U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
17. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
18. IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION – NATIONALIZATION –
INTERNATIONALIZATION 15 (1992).
19. Id. at 19–20.
20. See id. at 20.
21. WESLEY A. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS § 15, at 45 (1930) (“It 
is an elementary proposition of the common law cases, and is almost universally accepted by 
the American courts, that future disputes clauses and provisions for arbitration are 
revocable.”).
22. MACNEIL, supra note 18, at 20.
23. Id. at 25–30. Julius Henry Cohen and Charles Bernheimer led the reformist move-
ment. Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 302 (2015). Both 
men worked for the New York State Chamber of Commerce. Id. Bernheimer was the chair of 
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came the first state to enact such a law. The New York legislature 
made “written contract[s] to settle a controversy thereafter aris-
ing . . . valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, save upon such grounds 
as exist at law or equity for the revocation of any contract.”24 After
the success in New York, reformers advocated for similar changes
in other states and on the national level.25 This push culminated in 
the FAA’s enactment.
The American Bar Association’s Committee on Commerce, 
Trade and Commercial Law (the Committee) largely handled the 
drafting of the FAA. The drafting process was formally initiated at 
the ABA’s annual meeting in 1920.26 In 1922, the Committee re-
ported to the ABA general body that it had finished drafting a fed-
eral arbitration statute as part of a proposed package including a 
uniform state arbitration statute and an international treaty.27 The 
Committee opined that the package would “put the United States 
in the forefront in this procedural reform,” promoting commercial 
ethics, reducing litigation, speeding the resolution of disputes, and 
conserving judicial resources.28 After adoption by the ABA, the 
draft federal statute was introduced in both chambers of the Sixty-
Seventh Congress in December 1922.29
The bill’s treatment of labor disputes sparked criticism from two 
interested parties. First, the International Seamen’s Union adopted 
two resolutions against the federal arbitration bill.30 The Union’s
President saw the bill as a mechanism for the reintroduction of in-
voluntary labor.31 He predicted that the bill would “take away from 
all citizens except those who have the knowledge and the money to 
hire the best of lawyers and who can afford to wait, the present 
right to a day in court.”32 Second, Senator Thomas Sterling of 
South Dakota raised concerns based on a letter he received from 
one of his constituents, a lawyer who worked for one of the largest 
firms in the state.33 The lawyer’s firm had “significant clients in-
volved in interstate transportation,” including several large railroad 
the organization’s arbitration committee. Id. Cohen was the general counsel and a member 
of the ABA’s Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law. Id.
24. MACNEIL, supra note 18, at 35.
25. Id. at 34–47.
26. 43 A.B.A. Rep. 75 (1920); see also IMRE SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF 
MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA 104 (2013).
27. 45 A.B.A. Rep. 293–95 (1922).
28. Id. at 295.
29. See 67 Cong. Rec. 732, 797 (1922) (noting the introduction of H.R. 13522 and S. 
4214 “to make valid and enforceable written provisions or agreements for arbitration of dis-
putes arising out of contracts . . .”).
30. SZALAI, supra note 26, at 132; Finkin, supra note 6, at 284.
31. SZALAI, supra note 26, at 132; Finkin, supra note 6, at 284.
32. Seamen Condemn Arbitration Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1923, at 21.
33. SZALAI, supra note 26, at 132–35.
WINTER 2021] Seamen, Railroad Employees, and Uber Drivers? 531
companies, and he expressed concerns about the applicability of 
the proposed legislation to labor disputes involving interstate 
commerce.34
A subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee addressed 
the concerns about the inclusion of labor in the proposed arbitra-
tion statute at a hearing in January 1923. At that hearing, W.H.H 
Piatt, the chairman of the ABA Committee that drafted the bill, 
testified that:
It was not the intention of this bill to make an industrial ar-
bitration in any sense; and so I suggest that in as far as the 
committee is concerned, if your honorable committee 
should feel that there is any danger of that, they should add 
to the bill the following language, “but nothing herein con-
tained shall apply to seamen or any class of workers in in-
terstate and foreign commerce.” It is not intended that this 
shall be an act referring to labor disputes, at all.35
In a similar vein, the hearing record contained a letter from then-
Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover.36 In the letter, Hoover 
advocated for passing the FAA, pointing to the New York Arbitra-
tion Act’s ability to relieve congestion within the New York court 
system.37 But he also recognized the objection to the “inclusion of 
workers’ contracts in the law’s scheme.”38 Thus, he recommended 
that the following language be added to the proposed bill: “but 
nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment 
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers en-
gaged in interstate or foreign commerce.”39 This language differed 
from Piatt’s proposed exemption in two ways. First, Hoover’s sug-
gestion included railroad employees and, second, his language 
used the phrase “engaged in interstate . . . commerce,” rather than 
“in interstate . . . commerce.”40
34. Id.
35. Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbi-
tration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 79 (1923) [here-
inafter 1923 Hearings] (statement of W.H.H. Piatt, Chairman, A.B.A. Comm’n).
36. Id. at 14; see also Finkin, supra note 6, at 297. Indeed, Hoover was a proponent of the 
legislation because “arbitration fit perfectly with Hoover’s philosophy of industrial self-
governance and the elimination of waste.” SZALAI, supra note 26, at 108.
37. 1923 Hearings, supra note 35, at 14.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Although this choice of language may not have mattered to anyone at the time, see
Finkin, supra note 6, at 297, the decision to use the phrase “engaged . . . in commerce”
would matter for future interpretations of the Act. See infra Sections I.B, II.A.
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The bill did not receive any hearings in the House and was never 
reported out of committee in either chamber during the Sixty-
Seventh Congress.41 In the meantime, the ABA Committee made 
one substantive change to the draft bill.42 In section 1 of the bill, 
the Committee adopted Hoover’s suggested language and inserted 
“but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employ-
ment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers 
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”43 This is the language 
of the section 1 exemption today.44 The ABA general body ap-
proved the draft of the bill containing the exemption language at 
its annual meeting in 1923, and the bill became law with very few 
changes in 1925.45
B. Switch from Procedure to Substance
For most of the first thirty-five years of the FAA’s existence, the 
Supreme Court viewed the FAA as resting on Congress’s constitu-
tional power to regulate federal court procedure.46 In the 1960s, 
however, the Supreme Court’s understanding of the FAA’s consti-
tutional underpinnings began to change.47 The Court started to 
apply the FAA as substantive law under Congress’s power to regu-
late commerce.48 This doctrinal change culminated in Allied-Bruce 
41. MACNEIL, supra note 18, at 91. The bill did not progress out of committee in either 
chamber because of the “lateness of the session and the pressure of other important busi-
ness.” 46 A.B.A. Rep. 287 (1923). Nonetheless, the ABA received the assurance of “hearty 
cooperation in pressing the bill to passage in the next Congress” from the sponsors of the 
bill in both chambers. Id.
42. MACNEIL, supra note 18, at 91.
43. 46 A.B.A. Rep. 287 (1923); see also MACNEIL, supra note 18, at 91. In its report, the 
Committee stated that this change was made “[i]n order to eliminate th[e] opposition” of 
the International Seamen’s Union. 46 A.B.A. Rep. 287 (1923). Indeed, after the exemption 
was inserted in 1923, one of the leading proponents of the bill, Charles Bernheimer, stated 
that “we are not . . . convinced that it would not be in the interests of labor to have them 
included.” SZALAI, supra note 26, at 153. Even so, he conceded that “all industrial questions 
have been eliminated” in order to appease labor’s concerns. Id.
44. See 9 U.S.C. § 1.
45. See MACNEIL, supra note 18, at 91, 101.
46. Id. at 148. This understanding of the law was consistent with the intent of the draft-
ers. See H.R. REP. NO. 68–96, at 1 (1924) (“Whether an agreement for arbitration shall be 
enforced or not is a question is a question of procedure . . . .”); see also Bernhardt v. Poly-
graphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 202–03 (1956) (holding that under the Erie doctrine, state 
law applicable to arbitration governed an arbitration agreement in a contract relating to 
intrastate commerce).
47. See MACNEIL, supra note 18, at 148–49.
48. See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967) 
(“[I]t is clear beyond dispute that the federal arbitration statute is based upon and confined 
to the incontestable federal foundations of ‘control over interstate commerce and over ad-
miralty.’”); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) 
(holding that the FAA creates substantive law applicable in both state and federal court); 
WINTER 2021] Seamen, Railroad Employees, and Uber Drivers? 533
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, where the Court held that the words “in-
volving commerce” in section 2 of the FAA “signal[ed] an intent to 
exercise Congress’ commerce power to the full.”49
The shift in FAA jurisprudence had implications for the inter-
pretation of the section 1 exemption. The decision in Allied-Bruce 
indicated that the FAA’s reach was coextensive with the Congress’s
commerce power. If this principle were applied to the section 1 
exemption, it would mean that nearly every employment contract 
was ineligible for arbitration under the FAA.50 The federal courts of 
appeals eventually split as to whether the FAA applied to employ-
ment contracts at all.51 In 2001, the Supreme Court in Circuit City 
Stores, Inc. v. Adams held that only some employment contracts 
were exempted from the FAA.52 The Court reasoned that the 
phrase “engaged in commerce” in section 1 was “understood to 
have a more limited reach” than the phrase “involving commerce”
in section 2.53 The Court further concluded that the section 1 
phrase “any other class of workers engaged . . . in interstate com-
merce” was a residual clause limited by the references to “railroad 
employees” and “seamen” in the same sentence.54 The Court effec-
tively limited the scope of the exemption to “contracts of employ-
ment of transportation workers.”55
The Supreme Court did not directly address the scope of the 
exemption again until New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira in 2019.56 There, a 
truck driver entered into an independent contractor relationship 
with New Prime, an interstate trucking company.57 The driver
brought a wage suit against New Prime, and the company argued 
that the dispute should be resolved through arbitration.58 The 
driver contended that he was ineligible for arbitration, relying on 
the FAA’s section 1 exemption.59 New Prime contested this point, 
asserting that the exemption only applied to “contracts of em-
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (holding that the FAA preempts state laws 
hostile to arbitration).
49. 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995). See Nicolas Enrique O’Connor, Note, The “Insurmountable 
Textual Obstacle”: A Narrow Interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act, 32 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
855 (2019), for a critique of the decision in Allied-Bruce arguing that the “involving com-
merce” interpretation adopted by the Court was too broad.
50. See Brief for Respondent at 18–20, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 
(2001) (No. 99-1379), 2000 WL 1369473, at *19–20.
51. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 110–11 (detailing the disagreement in the lower courts).
52. Id. at 119.
53. Id. at 115–16.
54. Id. at 114–15.
55. Id. at 119.
56. 139 S. Ct. 532, 538, 543–44 (2019).
57. Id. at 536.
58. Id. at 536–37.
59. Id.
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ployment,” and the truck driver, an independent contractor, 
should be made to arbitrate his claims.60
Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, first held that, as a pro-
cedural point, courts should decide whether the section 1 exemp-
tion applies, rather than sending that question to the arbitrator.61
Next, the Court concluded that the statutory term “contracts of 
employment” included all agreements to perform work.62 Justice 
Gorsuch explained that “words generally should be ‘interpreted as 
taking their ordinary meaning at the time Congress enacted the 
statute.’”63 He concluded that when Congress adopted the FAA in 
1925, the term “contract of employment” meant “nothing more 
than an agreement to perform work” and therefore included 
“agreements that require independent contractors to perform 
work.”64 Thus, by broadening the reach of the section 1 exemption, 
the New Prime decision countered the Court’s expansion of the 
scope of the FAA under Congress’s commerce powers. 
Congress enacted the FAA to remedy the judiciary’s hostility to-
wards arbitration agreements.65 Thus, the original purpose of the 
FAA was mainly procedural—to make federal courts hold parties to 
their agreements to arbitrate future disputes.66 Because of this lim-
ited purpose, the drafters of the FAA were cognizant of the law’s
potential effects on employment arrangements and inserted lan-
guage to deal with this concern. Despite this history, the Supreme 
Court expanded the FAA’s reach and correspondingly narrowed 
the exemption, reasoning that Congress enacted the FAA using its 
commerce power.67 The Court’s decision in New Prime, however,
has slowed the expansion of the law—at least regarding the inter-
pretation of the section 1 exemption—and provides workers, such 
as rideshare drivers, an opportunity to potentially avoid arbitration.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 537.
62. Id. at 543–44.
63. Id. at 539 (quoting Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018)).
64. Id.
65. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118–19 (2001) (citing Allied-Bruce 
Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S 265, 272–73 (1995)).
66. See MACNEIL, supra note 18, at 148.
67. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967) (rea-
soning that the FAA is based in Congress’ commerce power); Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119 
(narrowing the scope of the exemption to only include transportation workers).
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II. INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE 
SECTION 1 EXEMPTION
New Prime may have profound effects on rideshare drivers’ ability 
to avoid arbitration. A worker must meet two statutory conditions 
to qualify under the FAA exemption: (1) he must have a “contract 
of employment” and (2) he must be a seaman, railroad employee, 
or “any other class of worker[] engaged in foreign or interstate 
commerce.”68 Rideshare drivers, as independent contractors, now 
satisfy the first prong of this test since contracts of employment are 
not limited to employer-employee relationships.69 Moreover, the
Supreme Court’s conclusion that courts, rather than arbitrators, 
should determine whether the exemption applies effectively leaves 
the remaining statutory interpretation question to lower courts.70
Thus, after New Prime, more and more courts will be asked to de-
cide whether rideshare drivers qualify as “any other class of workers 
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”71
Section II.A traces the development of the analytical framework 
employed by lower courts to define the exemption’s boundaries. 
This framework originated in a line of decisions before Circuit City
and narrowly construes the exemption’s language to include only 
those who move goods across state lines. Section II.B explains how 
this narrow application may prohibit rideshare drivers from quali-
fying under the exemption.
A. Development of the Section 1 Exemption Framework
The framework governing the applicability of the section 1 ex-
emption evolved in three stages of jurisprudence. First, before Cir-
cuit City, many courts limited the section 1 exemption to transpor-
68. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
69. See New Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 543–44; Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., 939 F.3d 210, 217 (3d 
Cir. 2019) (explaining that New Prime eliminated the “contract of employment” argument 
made by Uber in the suit under consideration by the court); Michele W. Berger, Supreme 
Court Decision a Boon for Truck Drivers and, Potentially, the Gig Economy, PENN TODAY (Feb. 4, 
2019), https://penntoday.upenn.edu/news/supreme-court-decision-boon-truck-drivers-and-
potentially-gig-economy [https://perma.cc/N2ZP-LPTV].
70. Previously, some courts concluded that arbitration clauses in some employment 
contracts utilized by ridesharing companies left the determination of the exemption’s ap-
plicability to the arbitrator. E.g., Richemond v. Uber Techs., Inc., 263 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 
1317–18 (S.D. Fla. 2017); Sienkaniec v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 17-CV-4489 (PJS/FLN), 2017 
WL 7791193, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 18, 2017).
71. See Singh, 939 F.3d at 219–26 (considering whether an Uber driver is exempted 
from the FAA); Rick Bales, “New Prime” and the Gig Economy, ARB. INFO, https:
//mulaw.missouri.edu/arbitrationinfo/new-prime-gig-economy (last visited Oct. 14, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/Y2S4-ACK3].
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tation workers and defined transportation workers as those who 
moved goods in interstate commerce. Next, in Circuit City, the Su-
preme Court sided with the majority of lower courts and limited 
the exemption to transportation workers but did not explicitly de-
fine that term. Finally, in the aftermath of Circuit City, courts con-
tinued to apply roughly the same pre-Circuit City framework. This 
has led to arbitrary and accidental distinctions between different 
classes of workers. The following discussion traces these three stag-
es of evolution.
1.  Pre-Circuit City Interpretation of the Section 1 Exemption
Before the decision in Circuit City, the main question lower 
courts faced was whether the exemption applied to all employment 
contracts. Most of the pre-Circuit City cases involved plaintiffs who 
did not work in the transportation industry at all.72 In deciding 
these cases, most courts of appeals held that the exemption did not 
reach all employment contracts and limited its applicability to only 
transportation workers. These courts defined transportation work-
ers with explicit reference to their role in the movement of goods 
in interstate commerce.73 For example, in Asplundh Tree Expert Co. 
v. Bates, the Sixth Circuit held that the exemption did not apply to 
a corporate executive for a consulting company.74 The court rea-
soned that the exemption only applied to workers “actually en-
gaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce in the 
same way that seamen and railroad workers are.”75 The court con-
cluded that the executive had to arbitrate the dispute with his em-
ployer because he did not qualify under this definition.76
The Third Circuit also limited the exemption to transportation 
workers, but did not explicitly define transportation workers with 
72. Singh, 939 F.3d at 224 (collecting cases prior to Circuit City and explaining that, in 
those cases, the courts “were confronted with the same question: whether the residual clause 
of § 1 covered the contracts of employment of those who were not in the transportation in-
dustry at all”).
73. E.g., Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 600–01 (6th Cir. 1995); see also
Paladino v. Avnet Comput. Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 1998); O’Neil v. 
Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 274 (4th Cir. 1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 
F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997); Cole v. Burns Int’l. Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1470–72 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997); Rojas v. TK Commc’ns, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996); Erving v. Va. 
Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972); Dickstein v. DuPont, 443 F.2d 
783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971).
74. 71 F.3d at 602.
75. Id. at 600–01.
76. Id. at 602.
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reference to the movement of goods in interstate commerce.77 In 
Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United Electric Radio & Machine Workers of 
America, the court applied the ejusdem generis canon in interpreting 
section 1 and concluded that the exemption included “only 
those . . . classes of workers who are actually engaged in the move-
ment of interstate or foreign commerce or in work so closely relat-
ed thereto as to be in practical effect part of it.”78 The court ex-
plained that the manufacturing employees were not exempted 
because they were “not acting directly in the channels of interstate 
commerce itself.”79 Notably, the court distinguished prior Third 
Circuit cases holding that commercial bus drivers were exempt 
from the FAA.80 The court explained that “the bus line employees 
in those cases [were] directly engaged in the channels of interstate 
transportation just as are railroad workers.”81
Finally, in Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., the Ninth Circuit held that 
all employment contracts were exempted under section 1, creating
a circuit split.82 The court explained that Congress’s commerce 
power when the FAA was enacted in 1925 only reached employees 
who transported goods or people in interstate commerce.83 By ex-
empting transportation workers, the FAA was effectively exempting 
all employment contracts that could possibly be covered under the 
Act.84 Therefore, under the expanded contemporary understand-
77. Tenney Eng’g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers Local 437, 207 F.2d 450, 
453 (3d Cir. 1953).
78. Id. at 452. Ejusdem generis is “[a] canon of construction holding that when a general 
word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to 
include only items of the same class as those listed.” Ejusdem generis, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The Third Circuit’s application of the ejusdem generis canon to 
the exemption language provided the framework for the Supreme Court’s analysis in Circuit 
City almost fifty years later. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001); 
Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588, 593 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that the deci-
sion in Tenney “presag[ed]” the decision in Circuit City).
79. Tenney, 207 F.2d at 453 (emphasis added); see also McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 
F.3d 573, 576 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that the section 1 exemption includes only “em-
ployees actually engaged in the channels of foreign or interstate commerce”).
80. Tenney, 207 F.2d at 453.
81. Id. (citing Amalgamated Ass’n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emps. v. Pa. 
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1951); Pa. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Amalga-
mated Ass’n of Street, Elec., Ry., & Motor Coach Emps., 193 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1952)). The
Circuit City Court cited Tenney along with other lower court decisions holding that the ex-
emption did not apply to all employment contracts. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 111. But 
grouping Tenney with these other cases ignores the fact that the Tenney definition of “trans-
portation workers” also embraced those workers who move passengers. While that distinc-
tion may not have been consequential when the main question faced by lower courts was 
whether all employment contracts were exempted from the FAA, it is especially crucial now 
that the Supreme Court has limited the reach of the exemption to transportation workers. 
See infra Section II.A.3.
82. 177 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), abrogated by Circuit City, 532 U.S. 
at 105.
83. Id. at 1087.
84. Id. at 1087, 1092.
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ing of Congress’s commerce power, the section 1 exemption had 
similarly broadened to include all employment contracts.85 The 
court also determined that the legislative history of the FAA 
“demonstrate[d] that the Act’s purpose was solely to bind mer-
chants who were involved in commercial dealings.”86 Finally, the 
court reasoned that the FAA’s requirement that a valid arbitration 
agreement “arise out of” a “contract evidencing a transaction in-
volving commerce” illustrated that Congress did not intend for the 
Act to apply to employment contracts at all.87 The court noted that,
when the FAA was passed, a “transaction” was “an act of buying and 
selling” and, therefore, the term did not encompass employment 
relationships.88
Thus, before Circuit City, lower courts mostly addressed whether 
employment contracts, as a category, fell within the scope of the 
FAA. The courts split on the question, with the majority holding 
that only employment contracts of transportation workers were ex-
empted from the FAA. Of those courts exempting only transporta-
tion workers, most defined the term as those who move goods in 
interstate commerce. In the minority, the Ninth Circuit held that 
all employment contracts were exempt from the FAA.
2.  Circuit City Decision
The Supreme Court resolved the split between the courts of ap-
peals in Circuit City. In that case, a sales counselor at Circuit City 
sued the company in federal district court in California.89 Circuit 
City sought and was granted a motion to compel arbitration based 
85. Id. at 1086–88. Other courts and scholars interpreting the exemption adopted simi-
lar reasoning. For example, in Arce v. Cotton Club of Greenville, Inc., the Northern District of 
Mississippi stated:
[I]nterstate commerce at the time the FAA was enacted was generally understood 
to be limited to maritime and railroad transactions. Thus, when Congress exclud-
ed employment contracts of maritime and railroad workers, it resulted in voiding 
the power to enforce arbitration clauses of most employment contracts. With the 
addition of the catch-all phrase “or any other class of worker engaged in foreign 
or interstate commerce,” all employment contracts would have been excluded 
from the arbitration enforcement power of the FAA.
883 F. Supp. 117, 123 (N.D. Miss. 1995). See also Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitra-
tion: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Em-
ployees, 64 U. MO. K.C. L. REV. 449, 468 (1996); Archibald Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Fed-
eral Courts, 67 HARV. L. REV. 591, 598 (1954).
86. Craft, 177 F.3d at 1089.
87. Id. at 1085, 1092.
88. Id. at 1085; see also id. at 1089 (concluding that the narrow interpretation of the 
word “transaction” is supported by the legislative history of the FAA).
89. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109–11 (2001).
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on a provision in their employment application.90 While the plain-
tiff’s appeal of the district court decision was pending, the Ninth 
Circuit decided Craft, holding that all employment contracts were 
exempt from the FAA.91 Therefore, in Circuit City, the Ninth Circuit 
simply applied Craft and reversed the lower court decision.92 Cir-
cuit City petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, highlighting 
the fact that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the exemption 
split from all other courts of appeals to consider the issue.93
The Supreme Court held that section 1 exempted only transpor-
tation workers, rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation. Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the majority, explained that:
Construing the residual phrase [“any other class of workers 
engaged in . . . commerce”] to exclude all employment 
contracts fails to give independent effect to the statute’s
enumeration of the specific categories of workers which 
precedes it; there would be no need for Congress to use the 
phrases “seamen” and “railroad employees” if those same 
classes of workers were subsumed within the meaning of 
the “engaged in . . . commerce” residual clause.94
The Court then applied the ejusdem generis and surplusage canons95
to conclude that the application of the residual clause in section 1 
should be limited to workers who are similar to railroad employees 
and seamen.96 Thus, the Court held that section 1 exempts only the 
contracts of transportation workers rather than all employment 
contracts.97
In limiting the exemption’s reach to transportation workers, the 
Court also rejected the Ninth Circuit’s argument that Congress in-
tended the exemption’s reach to be coextensive with its commerce 
power. For the Court, the plain meaning of section 1’s “engaged in 
commerce” foreclosed this reading because that phrase was nar-
90. Id. at 110.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 110–11.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 114.
95. The surplusage canon, or the presumption against surplusage, holds that “every 
word and every provision in a legal instrument is to be given effect.” Surplusage canon,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
96. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 115 (explaining that the residual clause “should be read to 
give effect to the terms ‘seamen’ and ‘railroad employees,’ and should itself be controlled 
and defined by reference to the[se] enumerated categories”).
97. Id. at 119.
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rower than the section 2’s “involving commerce.”98 Whereas “in-
volving commerce” signaled Congressional intent to regulate to 
the full extent allowed by the Commerce Clause, “engaged in 
commerce” was not meant to reach the outer limits of Congress’s
commerce power.99
Thus, the decision in Circuit City clarified two pieces of section 1 
exemption jurisprudence. First, the Court held that the exemption 
only reached the contracts of employment of transportation work-
ers rather than all employment contracts. Second, the Court ex-
plained that the exemption only covered those “engaged in com-
merce”—a narrower category than those involved in commerce.
3.  Aftermath of the Circuit City Decision
The Circuit City decision indicated that only transportation 
workers who are engaged in interstate commerce qualify for the 
exemption. The contested cases are now those in which courts are 
asked to define the scope of this requirement. Unfortunately, “lit-
tle consensus has been realized” in Circuit City’s aftermath.100 Some 
patterns have emerged, however, as courts use fact-based distinc-
tions to decide the cases before them. Courts have distinguished 
between: (1) workers who are involved in the transportation indus-
try and those who are not, (2) workers who move goods and those 
who move passengers, and (3) workers who travel across state lines 
and those who make purely intrastate trips.101
First, courts have held that workers must be employed in the 
transportation industry to qualify under the exemption.102 For ex-
98. Id. at 118. The Court had endorsed an expansive interpretation of “involving com-
merce” in Allied-Bruce. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995); see 
also supra Section I.B.
99. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 117 (quoting United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422
U.S. 271, 283 (1975)).
100. Muller v. Roy Miller Freight Lines, LLC, 246 Cal. Rptr. 3d 748, 753 (Ct. App. 2019) 
(internal quotation omitted).
101. To be sure, courts do not employ these distinctions as a strict test nor do all courts 
make these distinctions. Rather, these distinctions are based on an analysis of messy caselaw 
encompassing many different fact patterns across many different courts. Moreover, the fol-
lowing discussion does not capture all of the distinguishing characteristics that have been 
used by lower courts in the aftermath of Circuit City. Instead, this Note focuses on those 
characteristics that may prove relevant as lower courts are increasingly tasked with determin-
ing whether rideshare drivers are exempt from the FAA. See infra Section II.B (explaining 
that some of these distinguishing factors may prove to be obstacles for rideshare drivers’
ability to take advantage of the exemption). For a broader discussion of relevant factors, see
Lenz v. Yellow Transportation, Inc., 431 F.3d 348, 352 (8th Cir. 2005), which synthesized the 
universe of section 1 exemption cases and determined that there are eight factors that are 
relevant for determining whether a worker is exempted.
102. Adkins v. Labor Ready, 303 F.3d 496, 505–06 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that a tem-
porary employee of a company that provides manual day laborers was not exempted from 
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ample, in Hill v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit held that 
an account manager for a company that rented furniture and ap-
pliances to customers was not exempt from the FAA even though 
he delivered goods across state lines as part of his employment.103
The court explained that Circuit City emphasized a “class of workers 
in the transportation industry, rather than . . . workers who inci-
dentally transported goods interstate as part of their job.”104 The 
court concluded that merely interstate transportation was insuffi-
cient on its own for qualification under the exemption.105 The 
worker also must “be employed in the transportation industry” for 
the section 1 exemption to apply.106
Second, courts have sometimes defined transportation workers 
as only those workers who move goods, and therefore declined to 
exempt passenger-centric workers.107 For example, in rejecting a 
section 1 exemption claim by drivers for a car service company, the 
Southern District of New York explained that “transporting pas-
sengers interstate as part of a car service is too far removed from 
the type of work engaged in by seamen and railroad workers—that 
is, being a member of an industry that primarily involves the actu-
al, physical movement of goods through interstate commerce.”108
That same court found that the “involvement of physical goods [is] 
an indispensable element” for qualification as a transportation 
worker.109 Furthermore, one state court concluded that a commer-
cial airline pilot was not exempt from the FAA, even after acknowl-
edging that he moved cargo as part of his job, because his partici-
pation in the movement of goods was incidental to his 
transportation of passengers.110
By exempting only those who move goods, these courts have 
read Circuit City as a confirmation of the previous, judicially-
the FAA since neither “a majority or . . . plurality of [the worker’s] daily assignments were in 
transportation-related industries”); Tran v. Texan Lincoln Mercury, Inc., No. H-07-1815, 
2007 WL 2471616, at *1–2, *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2007) (holding that an employee of a car 
dealership was not a transportation worker because he worked in the automobile industry, 
not the transportation industry).
103. 398 F.3d 1286, 1289–90 (11th Cir. 2005).
104. Id. at 1289 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 1290.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Gadson v. SuperShuttle Int’l, No. 10-cv-01057-AW, 2011 WL 1231311 (D. 
Md. Mar. 30, 2011), vacated on other grounds by Murithi v. Shuttle Express, Inc., 712 F.3d 173 
(4th Cir. 2013); Kowalewski v. Samandarov, 590 F. Supp. 2d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
108. Kowalewski, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 484.
109. Id.
110. JetBlue Airways Corp. v. Stephenson, No. 650691/2010, 2010 WL 6781684, at *3 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 22, 2010). But see Lepera v. ITT Corp., No. 97-1461, 1997 WL 535165, at 
*7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 1997) (holding that an airline pilot who transported passengers inter-
state is exempt from the FAA).
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imposed definition of transportation workers.111 Circuit City, howev-
er, did not affirmatively endorse a definition of transportation 
workers that focuses on the movement of goods. Because the plain-
tiff was a sales counselor with no connection to the transportation 
industry, the Court did not need to define the term. At one point 
in the opinion, the Court noted that “[m]ost courts of appeals 
conclude the exclusion provision is limited to transportation work-
ers, defined, for instance, as those workers ‘actually engaged in the 
movement of goods in interstate commerce.’”112 The Court’s use of 
“for instance” indicates that it did not mean to clarify the entire 
field of transportation workers but merely provide an example.113
Lower courts have read Circuit City as confirmation that the term 
“transportation worker” includes only those who move goods, even 
though the decision did not formally endorse a definition of the 
term.
Reading the goods-centric definition of transportation workers 
into Circuit City without the Supreme Court’s endorsement extends 
the definition beyond its useful application. The goods-centric def-
inition was meant to demarcate a boundary between workers who 
had no connection to the transportation industry and those who 
did.114 It was not intended to answer the question courts now face: 
the strength of the connection to interstate commerce necessary 
for classification as a transportation worker.115 Therefore, by in-
cluding only those who move goods without considering these 
changed circumstances, courts are using a tool that was built for a 
different purpose.
Third, courts have held that only workers who actually move 
across state lines are engaged in commerce and exempt from the 
111. See, e.g., Brown v. Nabors Offshore Corp., 339 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2003) (ex-
plaining that that the Court’s analysis in Circuit City was consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s
prior decision limiting the transportation worker exemption to include only those who 
move goods in interstate commerce); Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280, 
1284, 1284 n.1 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that in Circuit City, the Court “affirmed the va-
lidity” of the circuit’s prior opinion holding that the exemption only applies to transporta-
tion workers engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce). For a discussion 
of lower court decisions prior to Circuit City, see supra Section II.A.1.
112. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 112 (2001) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
113. See Cunningham v. Lyft, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 3d 37, 44 (D. Mass. 2020) (reasoning that 
the Supreme Court’s use of “for instance” in Circuit City indicated that the Court did not 
intend to define the term “transportation workers”).
114. Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., 939 F.3d 210, 224 (3d Cir. 2019).
115. See Cunningham, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 43 (“Circuit City and each of the earlier appellate 
decisions . . . addressed whether the exemption excluded contracts of non-transportation 
workers and did not address the nuances between different types of transportation work-
ers.”).
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FAA.116 For example, in Wallace v. Grubhub Holdings, Inc., the Sev-
enth Circuit considered whether couriers for a food-delivery ser-
vice were “engaged in interstate commerce.”117 There, the plaintiff-
workers delivered food to customers from local restaurants when 
requested through a smartphone application.118 They argued that 
they were transportation workers because they facilitated the 
transportation of food that may have originated out of state or 
been previously transported in interstate commerce.119 The court 
rejected this “stream of commerce” argument and held that the 
plaintiffs did not qualify for the exemption because they did not 
move goods across state lines.120 The court reasoned that the plain-
tiffs’ argument was foreclosed by Circuit City’s instruction to nar-
rowly construe the exemption.121
Other courts, including the First Circuit and the Ninth Circuit,
have not required that workers move across state lines when the 
workers in question are part of a broader distribution system that 
transports goods in interstate commerce.122 Often these cases in-
volve last-mile delivery truck drivers—truckers who deliver goods 
that have previously moved across state lines, but do not them-
selves move across state lines during the course of their work.123 On 
their face, last-mile delivery truck drivers are identical to food ser-
vice couriers since both make purely local deliveries. Yet, courts 
have been more receptive to the stream of commerce conception 
of interstate commerce in the last-mile delivery truck driver cas-
116. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 50 v. Kienstra Precast, LLC, 702 F.3d 954, 
957–58 (7th Cir. 2012). In Kienstra Precast, a union representing concrete mixer drivers al-
leged that Kienstra violated their collective bargaining agreement and the company tried to 
compel arbitration. Id. at 955. Even though some of the drivers had made interstate deliver-
ies, the company argued that their employees did not qualify for the exemption because the 
interstate trips were an insubstantial part of their business. Id. at 958. The court rejected this 
argument and held that even a minimal proportion of interstate trips was sufficient for ex-
emption under the FAA. Id.
117. 970 F.3d 798, 800 (7th Cir. 2020).
118. Id. at 799.
119. Id. at 802–03.
120. Id. at 803–04; see also Levin v. Caviar, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 
2015); Magana v. DoorDash, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 3d 891, 899–900 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (holding 
that a driver for DoorDash, a similar food-delivery service, was not exempt from the FAA 
because he did not “allege that he either moved or supervised the movement of goods 
across state lines”); Lee v. Postmates Inc., No. 18-cv-03421-JCS, 2018 WL 6605659, at *7 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2018) (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that they were transportation work-
ers because they did not “cite any case holding that making only local deliveries, for a com-
pany that does not hold itself out as transporting goods between states, constitutes engaging 
in interstate commerce within the meaning of the statute”).
121. Wallace, 970 F.3d at 800–03.
122. See, e.g., Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., 966 F.3d 10, 26 (1st Cir. 2020); Rittmann v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904, 915 (9th Cir. 2020); Diaz v. Mich. Logistics, 167 F. Supp. 
3d 375, 380 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); Nieto v. Fresno Beverage Co., 245 Cal. Rptr. 3d 69, 76–77 
(Ct. App. 2019).
123. See Waithaka, 966 F.3d at 26; Rittmann, 971 F.3d at 907.
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es.124 One district court distinguished the last-mile delivery truck 
driver cases from the food service courier cases by explaining that 
the interstate journey of the food delivered by the courier ends 
when the ingredients are delivered to the restaurant before the 
courier’s involvement.125 The ingredients that moved interstate be-
come a new, purely local product when they are turned into a fin-
ished meal.126 Thus, the finished product delivered by the food ser-
vice courier is not a good in interstate commerce.127 On the other 
hand, the packages delivered by last-mile delivery truck drivers are 
continually in interstate commerce until the worker delivers the 
goods to the consumer.128
The last-mile delivery truck driver cases also indicate that the 
three distinctions are interrelated. That is, courts are more likely to 
require the movement of goods across state lines where the worker 
is not clearly involved in the transportation industry.129 Indeed, one 
court holding that last-mile delivery drivers are exempt from the 
FAA began its discussion by explaining that truck drivers were the 
quintessential example of a transportation worker.130 Perhaps, 
where the trucking industry is involved, courts are less likely to re-
quire that the worker physically move goods across state lines.131
Even though the Circuit City Court did not endorse a specific 
definition of transportation workers, lower courts have drawn dis-
124. E.g., Waithaka, 966 F.3d at 26 (concluding that “last-mile delivery workers who haul 
goods on the final legs of interstate journeys are transportation workers”); Rittmann, 971
F.3d at 915 (holding that last-mile delivery drivers are exempt from the FAA).
125. Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 3d 335, 341 (D. Mass. 2019), aff’d, 966 
F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2020).
126. Id.; see also Rittman v. Amazon.com, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1201–02 (W.D. 
Wash. 2019), aff’d, 971 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2020).
127. Waithaka, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 341.
128. Id. at 341–42.
129. See Veliz v. Cintas Corp., No. C 03-1180 SBA, 2004 WL 2452851, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 5, 2004) (observing that “the more related to the transportation industry an enterprise 
is, the less necessary it becomes for the employee to be directly transporting goods”).
130. See Waithaka, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 340.
131. Indeed, some courts have held that those who merely supervised the movement of 
goods in interstate commerce were exempt from the FAA. But these cases are also limited to 
the trucking industry. See Zamora v. Swift Transp. Co., No. EP-07-CA-00400-KC, 2008 WL 
2369769, at *7 (W.D. Tex. June 3, 2008) (finding that a terminal manager for an interstate 
trucking company whose job duties included monitoring the productivity of the fleet, moni-
toring revenue, improving driver retention, managing costs, reducing expenses, and moni-
toring full utilization of equipment was exempted from the FAA). But see Fuentes v. Rush 
Truck Ctrs. of Cal., Inc., No. EDCV 18-10446 (SPx), 2019 WL 3240100, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. 
Mar. 11, 2019) (acknowledging that a worker need not be personally involved in the inter-
state movement of goods to qualify under the exemption, but holding that a mechanic must 
arbitrate his disputes because he is not a transportation worker); Bell v. Ryan Transp. Serv., 
Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d 1251, 1254–56 (D. Kan. 2016) (holding that a carrier sales representa-
tive employed by a third-party logistics company whose duties included locating trucking 
companies for transport and negotiating the price for trucking goods was not exempt from 
the FAA).
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tinctions that generally narrow the categories of workers that quali-
fy for the section 1 exemption. Courts have required that workers 
be employed in the transportation industry, move goods, and phys-
ically move across state lines.
B. Application of the Post-Circuit City Framework to 
Rideshare Drivers
To date, there have not been many cases involving rideshare 
drivers. But from existing case law, it is clear that the post-Circuit 
City distinctions create multiple obstacles for rideshare drivers. The 
first obstacle is the requirement that the worker move goods to 
qualify as a transportation worker. Federal district courts in New 
Jersey, Ohio, Florida, California, and the District of Columbia132
have all held that rideshare drivers are not exempt from the FAA 
because they move primarily passengers in interstate commerce ra-
ther than goods. However, the Third Circuit recently held that the 
“FAA . . . operate[s] to exclude from FAA coverage the contracts of 
employment of all classes of transportation workers, so long as they 
are engaged in interstate commerce,” overturning the District of 
New Jersey.133 Additionally, the District of Minnesota recently held 
that rideshare drivers may qualify for the exemption even though 
they do not primarily move goods in interstate commerce.134 Thus, 
although the application of the “goods-centric” framework to pas-
senger-oriented workers is an ominous sign for rideshare drivers, 
the few courts to recently address the issue are split as to whether 
that framework should be applied in this new context.
Second, the requirement that a worker “engage” in interstate 
commerce by moving across state lines is a potential obstacle for 
rideshare drivers. For example, the District Court of Minnesota 
held that passenger-centric rideshare drivers could be exempted 
from the FAA, but would not exempt the individual plaintiff be-
cause he had never driven a passenger across state lines.135 Instead, 
the court asked for additional briefing to determine whether the 
132. Grice v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 18-2995 (GJSx), 2020 WL 497487, at *6 (C.D. 
Cal. Jan. 7, 2020); Scaccia v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:18-cv-00418, 2019 WL 2476811, at *5 
(S.D. Ohio June 13, 2019); Gray v. Uber, Inc., No. 8:18-cv-3093-T-30SPF, 2019 WL 1785094, 
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2019); Tyler v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 19-3492, 2020 WL 5569948, at *6 
(D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2020); Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., 235 F. Supp. 3d 656, 671 (D.N.J. 2017), 
vacated by Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., 939 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2019).
133. Singh, 939 F.3d at 226.
134. Sienkaniec v. Uber Techs., Inc., 401 F. Supp. 3d 870, 871–72 (D. Minn. 2019).
135. Id. at 872.
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plaintiff was part of a class of workers who move across state lines.136
This request revealed that the court’s definition of transportation 
workers was still focused on the need to move across state lines. Re-
latedly, the Third Circuit remanded the question of whether the 
Uber driver-plaintiff was “engaged” in interstate commerce.137 Fi-
nally, two separate district judges in the Northern District of Cali-
fornia recently held that rideshare drivers are not part of a class of 
workers engaged in interstate commerce.138 Therefore, the few 
courts to address this issue have largely been unwilling to find that 
rideshare drivers are engaged in interstate commerce as a class, 
and some courts have required individual rideshare drivers to 
move across state lines to qualify for the section 1 exemption.139
Given the dearth of cases involving rideshare drivers, courts have 
a unique opportunity to rethink the post-Circuit City conception of 
the transportation worker exemption. New Prime’s holding that in-
dependent contractors qualify under the exemption removes one 
legal barrier for rideshare drivers. Yet, given the current doctrinal 
focus on the movement of goods across state lines, rideshare driv-
ers still may not be exempt from the FAA. The doctrine applied to 
rideshare drivers is evolving, however, giving courts the opportuni-
ty to adapt the section 1 exemption analysis to match technological 
development.
The lower courts have largely declined to change the analytical 
framework in the aftermath of Circuit City. Not doing so, however,
will create random demarcations between classes of workers. For 
example, the focus on goods means that a rideshare driver who 
regularly makes trips on interstate highways to drive passengers to 
airports is not a transportation worker. Meanwhile, for some 
courts, a last-mile delivery truck driver who makes purely local de-
liveries is a transportation worker.140 These arbitrary and accidental 
boundaries will become unworkable as more rideshare drivers seek 
exemption from the FAA. Courts must recognize that the current 
136. See id. at 872–73. The court specified that the parties’ briefing should focus on Ub-
er’s national operations and the number of trips that Uber drivers, as a whole, make across 
state lines. Id.
137. Singh, 939 F.3d at 226–27.
138. Rogers v. Lyft, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 3d 904, 914–17 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (holding that, 
although section 1 is not limited to those workers who move goods in interstate commerce, 
Lyft drivers, as a class, are not engaged in interstate commerce and therefore do not qualify 
for the exemption); Capriole v. Uber Techs., Inc., 460 F. Supp. 3d 919, 929–32 (N.D. Cal. 
2020) (finding that Uber drivers are not engaged in interstate commerce because they rare-
ly make interstate trips).
139. But see Cunningham v. Lyft, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 3d 37, 46–47 (D. Mass. 2020) (hold-
ing that Lyft drivers, as a class, are engaged in commerce because “some of [their] passen-
gers are in continuity of motion in interstate travel”).
140. See supra Section II.A.3.
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framework is unsuitable for the questions posed by rideshare driv-
ers and take a broader approach to the section 1 exemption.
III. DETERMINING THE HISTORIC ORDINARY MEANING OF THE 
SECTION 1 EXEMPTION
The two legal obstacles rideshare drivers still face in seeking ex-
emption under the FAA—the “goods” requirement and the “inter-
state travel” requirement—can both be traced to the text of section 
1. The Supreme Court in Circuit City reasoned that the statutory 
references to “seamen” and “railroad employees” limited the reach 
of the exemption.141 Lower courts have concluded that, when the 
FAA was passed in 1925, seamen and railroad employees moved 
only goods and therefore contemporary workers must also move 
goods to qualify for the exemption.142 The Court in Circuit City ex-
plained that the term “engaged in . . . commerce” in the residual 
clause should be narrowly construed.143 Lower courts have deter-
mined that this language encompasses only workers who move 
across state lines.144 In New Prime, Justice Gorsuch stressed that the 
FAA “should be interpreted as taking [its] ordinary meaning . . .
[which is the] meaning at the time Congress enacted the stat-
ute.”145 These narrow interpretations of the FAA are only correct if 
they are supported by the historical understanding of the statutory 
terms.
This Part undertakes a historical and textual analysis of the stat-
ute and argues that it does not support the current interpretation 
of the exemption. Rather, the legislative history and the historic 
ordinary understanding of the FAA’s terms demonstrate that the 
exemption embraces passenger-oriented transportation workers 
who are in the flow of commerce, even if they only move intrastate. 
Section III.A briefly discusses legislative history, which indicates 
that section 1 of the FAA should be construed more broadly. Sec-
tion III.B analyzes the historic, ordinary meaning of the terms 
“seamen” and “railroad workers” to show that neither term limits 
the residual clause of the exemption to only those who move 
141. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001).
142. E.g., Kowalewski v. Samandarov, 590 F. Supp. 2d 477, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding 
that passenger transportation was “too far removed” from the type of work undertaken by 
seamen and railroad workers when the FAA was passed). But see Singh, 939 F.3d at 222 (hold-
ing that passenger-centric transportation workers may qualify under the exemption).
143. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 115.
144. See, e.g., supra note 116 and accompanying text.
145. New Prime v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019) (alterations in original) (quoting 
Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018)).
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goods. Section III.C asserts that the original understanding of the 
term “engaged in . . . interstate commerce” does not require that 
the worker move across state lines. Section III.D concludes that the 
inclusion of rideshare drivers in the exemption is a positive policy 
outcome.
A. Clues from the FAA’s Legislative History
Although there is very little legislative history addressing the sec-
tion 1 exemption itself, the majority of the statements made by the 
FAA’s drafters indicate that the exemption should be construed 
more broadly than it is currently interpreted. In particular, the leg-
islative history strongly suggests that the FAA was only meant to 
apply to contracts between merchants.146 W.H.H. Piatt, the chair-
man of the ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commer-
cial Law, explained that the FAA was “purely an act to give the 
merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing 
with each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do 
it.”147 He added that the FAA only implicated “contract[s] between 
merchants one with another, buying and selling goods.”148 Other 
witnesses described the bill solely with reference to disputes be-
tween businessmen.149 One witness explained that an identical state 
bill was successful because “business men have adopted the prac-
tice of getting together and settling their business differences.”150
Additionally, the New York arbitration law upon which the FAA was 
based was designed to promote arbitration between merchants.151
146. See Leslie, supra note 23, at 305 (“The most important fact about the testimony, 
hearings, and reports leading up to congressional enactment of the FAA is that every wit-
ness, every Senator, and every Representative discussed one issue and one issue only: arbitra-
tion of contract disputes between merchants.”); Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: 
How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99,
106 (2006) (“The hearings make clear that the focus of the Act was merchant-to-merchant 
arbitrations.”).
147. 1923 Hearings at 9 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt).
148. Id. at 10.
149. See Leslie, supra note 23, at 306–07 (explaining that various witnesses provided ex-
amples which only pertained to disputes between businessmen and that the discussion of 
the bill focused on the commercial world); Moses, supra note 146, at 106 (“All of the exam-
ples given by [one witness] as to cases he knew about or cases he had personally been in-
volved with through the New York Chamber of Commerce were cases between merchants.”).
150. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the 
J. Comm. of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 31 (1924) [hereinafter 1924 Hearings] 
(statement of William J. Vance).
151. See Julius Henry Cohen, Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New York Statute, 31 
YALE L.J. 147, 150–52 (1921) (analyzing the benefits of the New York law that pre-dated the 
FAA and explaining that “men of commercial expertise . . . know whether the contract is of 
a kind under which disputes can be better disposed of by trade committees or by twelve in-
expert strangers to the trade”); see also Leslie, supra note 23, at 305–06.
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Presumably because of this focus on arbitration between mer-
chants, the bill’s main support came from a number of merchant 
and trade associations.152
The little legislative history that is specific to the section 1 ex-
emption suggests that the drafters intended to exclude all labor 
contracts from the FAA. As discussed in Part I, the FAA’s drafters 
inserted the exemption as a response to criticism brought by the 
International Seamen’s Union, among others.153 Relatedly, the 
American Federation of Labor later explained to its members that 
it lifted its objection to the bill because the text added to section 1 
“exempted labor from the provisions of the law.”154 In the hearings, 
Piatt explained that the bill was “not intended [to] be an act refer-
ring to labor disputes at all.”155
Before the decision in Circuit City, the academic and judicial de-
bate regarding the section 1 exemption concerned whether or not 
all employment contracts were exempted from the FAA.156 In Cir-
cuit City, the Supreme Court held that the exemption applied only 
to transportation worker contracts.157 The Court reasoned that, be-
cause the FAA was meant to overcome judicial hostility to arbitra-
tion, Congress intended the Act to apply broadly.158 For the Court, 
a narrow construction of the exemption left very few arbitration 
agreements outside the FAA’s scope, thereby vindicating Con-
gress’s intent.159 Post-Circuit City, courts have sometimes declined to 
exempt rideshare drivers from the FAA, pointing to the Court’s
reasoning about the purpose of the statute.160
152. See id. at 21–22 (listing the various groups supporting the bill).
153. See supra Section I.A.
154. Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Annual Convention of the American Federation of 
Labor 52 (1925), cited in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 127 n.8 (2001) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Moses, supra note 146, at 147.
155. 1923 Hearings at 10 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt); see also supra note 43 (explaining 
that Charles Bernheimer, an ABA member and one of the leading proponents of the bill, 
believed that the provision eliminated employment contracts from the scope of the Act).
156. Compare Finkin, supra note 6, at 298–99 (arguing that Congress intended to exempt 
all employment contracts from the FAA), with William F. Kolakowski III, Note, The Federal 
Arbitration Act and Individual Employment Contracts: A Better Means to an Equally Just End, 93 
MICH. L. REV. 2171, 2175 (1995) (arguing that most employment contracts should not be 
exempted from the FAA). Notably, Kolakowski did not argue that the legislative history of 
the FAA supported a narrow interpretation of the exemption. Instead, he did not draw any 
“firm conclusions . . . about congressional intent regarding the exception’s scope” and con-
tended that the text of the Act favors a narrow reading. Kolakowski, supra, at 2175. Some 
scholars still argue that the decision in Circuit City was inconsistent with the legislative history 
of the FAA. See Leslie, supra note 23, at 305; Moses, supra note 146, at 146.
157. 532 U.S. at 118–19.
158. Id.; see also supra Section I.A (explaining that the FAA was enacted in response to 
the judiciary’s unwillingness to enforce arbitration agreements in court).
159. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 118–19.
160. E.g., Grice v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 18-2995 (GJSx), 2020 WL 497487, at *6 
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2020); see also supra Sections II.A.3, II.B (discussing the lower courts’ inter-
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The legislative history of the FAA suggests, however, that lower 
courts have narrowed the exemption too far and ignored the draft-
ers’ reservations regarding the inclusion of labor within the scope 
of the Act. At the very least, the legislative history indicates that the 
law was only meant to apply in specific circumstances (disputes be-
tween merchants) and certainly does not prohibit the courts from 
applying the exemption more broadly. Courts should not shy away 
from broadly construing the exemption within the confines of the 
Circuit City decision, if the language of the statute allows such a
reading. The next two sections of this Note analyze the history and 
text of the exemption and conclude that the language supports a 
broader reading.
B. Ordinary Meaning of “Seamen” and “Railroad Employees”
In Circuit City, the Supreme Court held that the statute’s “explic-
it reference to ‘seamen’ and ‘railroad employees’” limits the reach 
of the section 1 exemption.161 Thus, looking at the definition of 
these terms is helpful in determining what “other class[es] of 
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” look like.162
The following discussion analyzes the statutory and judicially-
proscribed definitions of these terms, and concludes that both in-
clude workers who move passengers. Rideshare drivers are there-
fore squarely within the boundaries demarcated by these terms.
1.  Definition of Seamen
The term “seamen” is not limited to only those who move goods. 
Because the FAA does not define “seamen,” courts interpreting 
section 1 typically look to judicial interpretations of “seamen” from
the Jones Act.163 The Jones Act provides a cause of action for sea-
men “injured in the course of employment” against their employ-
er.164 The Jones Act does not provide a definition for “seamen” ei-
ther but the Supreme Court has interpreted the term broadly to 
mean “a person . . . employed on board a vessel in furtherance of 
pretation of the exemption after Circuit City as applied to rideshare drivers and in the con-
text of other employment relationships).
161. 532 U.S. at 114.
162. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1.
163. E.g., Brown v. Nabors Offshore Corp., 339 F.3d 391, 393 (5th Cir. 2003); Buckley v. 
Nabors Drilling USA Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 958, 964 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 2002); Veliz v. Cintas 
Corp., No. C 03-1180 SBA, 2004 WL 2452851, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2004).
164. 46 U.S.C. § 30104.
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[the vessel’s] purpose.”165 Importantly, the Court has explained 
that this was the definition of seamen under maritime law when 
Congress passed the Jones Act in 1920—only five years before en-
acting the FAA.166 Some courts have applied this definition of sea-
men to the FAA, exempting workers who were employed on vessels 
that did not move goods at all.167
Additionally, the historical understanding of seamen clearly con-
templated those who worked on passenger ships. For example, the 
Shipping Commissioner’s Act of 1872 (SCA) defined seamen to 
include “every person . . . who shall be employed or engaged to 
serve in any capacity on board” a ship covered by the SCA.168 This 
broad definition is consistent with late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth century judicial interpretations of the term. Maritime cases 
both before and around the time the FAA was passed held that 
firemen,169 surgeons,170 cooks,171 musicians,172 and bartenders173 were 
all seamen.174 None of these workers are involved in the movement 
of goods. For some of these workers, such as bartenders and musi-
cians, their presence is only necessary on passenger vessels. Indeed, 
the test of whether one is a seaman has historically depended on 
(1) whether the vessel is in navigation, (2) the permanency of the 
person’s connection to the vessel, and (3) whether the services 
rendered are maritime in nature.175 These characteristics make no 
distinction between employment on a vessel that moves passengers 
and a vessel that moves goods. Thus, at the time the FAA was 
passed, the term “seamen” did not require that the worker partici-
pate in the movement of goods instead of passengers.
165. McDermott Int’l., Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 346 (1991).
166. See id. at 342.
167. E.g., Brown, 339 F.3d at 393 (holding that an employee on an offshore drilling rig 
was a seaman and therefore exempt from the FAA).
168. See Veliz, 2004 WL 2452851, at *4 (quoting the Shipping Commissioners Act of 
1872).
169. E.g., Wilson v. The Ohio, 30 F. Cas. 149, 150 (E.D. Pa. 1834) (No. 17,825) (holding 
that a fireman on a ship carrying passengers and merchandise could sue in admiralty for his 
wages).
170. E.g., Hoof v. Pac. Am. Fisheries, 284 F. 174, 176 (W.D. Wash. 1922).
171. E.g., Allen v. Hallet, 1 F. Cas. 472, 472–74 (S.D.N.Y. 1849) (No. 223).
172. E.g., The Sea Lark, 14 F.2d 201, 201–02 (W.D. Wash. 1926).
173. E.g., The J.S. Warden, 175 F. 314, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1910).
174. Notably, in New Prime, the Supreme Court recognized these early definitions of 
seamen. There, defendant New Prime argued that when the FAA was passed in 1925, the 
terms “seamen” and “railroad employees” included only employees, and not independent 
contractors. New Prime v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 542 (2019). But Justice Gorsuch rejected 
this argument, explaining that the terms swept broadly as a historical matter, and cited to 
the various cases defining seamen to include basically any employee on board a vessel in 
navigation. Id. at 543–44.
175. 1 MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN 6 (2d ed. 1962).
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2.  Definition of Railroad Employees
The understanding of the term “railroad employees” at the time 
the FAA was passed also included workers who transported both 
goods and passengers.176 Although the FAA does not define the 
term railroad employees, other acts provide definitions that in-
clude both passenger and freight railroad workers.177 For example, 
in 1898, Congress defined railroad employees in the Erdman Act 
as “all persons actually engaged in any capacity in train operation 
or train service of any description.”178
The Supreme Court’s historical discussion in Circuit City further
indicates that railroad employees who transported passengers were 
exempt from the FAA. The Court speculated that railroad employ-
ees and seamen were exempted from the FAA because, at the time 
of the Act’s passage, there were statutory dispute resolution 
schemes already in place for those workers.179 The Court cited the 
Transportation Act of 1920 and the Railway Labor Act of 1926 as 
examples of pre-existing federal railroad employee dispute resolu-
tion regulations.180 At the time the FAA was passed, both of these 
laws covered “carriers” and defined this term to include “sleeping 
car compan[ies].”181 Furthermore, the Railway Labor Act’s jurisdic-
tion over “carriers” referenced railroads subject to the Interstate 
Commerce Act (ICA).182 The ICA exercised jurisdiction over 
“common carriers engaged in . . . the transportation of passengers 
or property.”183
In short, the Transportation Act and the Railway Labor Act—the 
laws that created the dispute resolution mechanisms for railroad 
employees—covered workers who moved both passengers and 
goods.184 Extending the Court’s logic that these dispute resolution 
mechanisms and the FAA were mutually exclusive, these passenger-
176. See Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., 939 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2019) (arguing that the 
historical understanding of the term railroad employee supports the conclusion that the 
definition of the term “transportation worker” extends to “workers who transport goods as 
well as those who transport passengers”).
177. See, e.g., New Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 543 (discussing the Railroad Labor Board’s broad 
construction of the term “employee” in the Transportation Act of 1920 and concluding that 
the Erdman Act “evince[s] an equally broad understanding of ‘railroad employees’”).
178. Act of June 1, 1898, § 370, 30 Stat. 424.
179. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 121 (2001) (“It is reasonable to as-
sume that Congress excluded ‘seamen’ and ‘railroad employees’ from the FAA for the sim-
ple reason that it did not wish to unsettle established or developing statutory dispute resolu-
tion scheme covering specific workers.”)
180. See id.
181. Transportation Act of 1920, § 209, 41 Stat. 464; Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 1, 44 
Stat. 577.
182. Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 1, 44 Stat. 577.
183. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, § 104, 24 Stat. 379.
184. See Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., 939 F.3d 210, 221–22 (3d Cir. 2019).
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centric employees must have been exempt from the FAA at the 
time the Act was passed.
The prevalence of passenger railroad transportation when the 
FAA was passed in 1925 further illustrates that Congress intended 
to exempt railroad employees who moved passengers. Indeed, in 
1915, railroads carried over one million passengers with 55,000 
passenger cars.185 Over the course of the 1920s, the use of railroads 
declined with the increasing growth of automobile travel.186 In
1929, however, there were still 20,000 passenger trains.187 If the 
FAA drafters wanted to make a distinction between the two sets of 
workers, they would have made this clear. But they made no such 
indication. Instead, the definition of railroad employee at the time 
included both freight and passenger railroad workers.
Finally, more recent judicial interpretations of “railroad em-
ployees” include workers who move passengers. In 1936, Congress 
amended the Railway Labor Act to include “every common carrier 
by air engaged in interstate or foreign commerce.”188 In response, 
multiple courts have interpreted the provision to apply to passen-
ger airlines.189
C. Historic Understanding of “Engaged in . . . Interstate Commerce”
In Circuit City, the Supreme Court held that the phrase “engaged 
in . . . interstate commerce” in section 1’s residual clause did not 
make the reach of the exemption coextensive with the reach of 
Congress’s commerce power.190 Instead, the Court explained that 
workers “engaging” in commerce constitute a narrower category 
than those “affecting” or “involving” commerce.191 Lower courts 




188. 45 U.S.C. § 181; see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 121 (2001).
189. See, e.g., Melanson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 931 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1991).
190. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 115.
191. Id. Prior to Circuit City, there was some academic debate as to whether Congress 
intended any distinction between these statutory terms. Compare Finkin, supra note 6, at 294 
n.55 (arguing that the drafters of the FAA could not have intended this distinction where 
the early Supreme Court cases did not recognize the distinction between “engaging in 
commerce” and “involving” or “affecting” commerce), with Kolakowski, supra note 156, at 
2177–79 (arguing that the early Supreme Court cases indicated that the term “engaged” in 
commerce was narrower than the term “affecting” commerce). One scholar has recently 
reinvigorated this debate by arguing that Congress intended section 2’s “involving 
commerce” language to be narrower than the meaning eventually given to it by the 
Supreme Court. See O’Connor, supra note 49, at 857. For O’Connor, this narrower 
interpretation of “involving commerce” means that Circuit City “never needed to address 
whether the section 1 exemption applies to all contracts of employment because the only 
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have largely read Circuit City to indicate that the worker must move 
across state lines in order to qualify under the exemption.192 But 
this interpretation is unnecessary and inconsistent with the histori-
cal interpretation of the phrase “engaged in . . . commerce,” which 
does not impose this requirement.
Historically, the term “engaged in . . . commerce” has embraced 
the entire stream of commerce, including intrastate movement.193
Courts have interpreted federal statutes passed around the same 
time as the FAA that use the “engaged in commerce” language to 
embrace a stream-of-commerce conception of interstate com-
merce. For example, the Clayton Act,194 passed in 1914, applies to 
the “flow of interstate commerce—the practical, economic conti-
nuity in the generation of goods and services for interstate markets 
and their transport and distribution to the consumer.”195 In Circuit 
City, the Supreme Court approvingly cited the Clayton Act defini-
tion in arguing that “engaging” in commerce was narrower than 
“affecting” commerce.196 If the Court intended to limit the exemp-
tion to only those workers who move across state lines, it would not 
have cited a definition of “engaged in commerce” that explicitly 
uses a flow of commerce understanding of the phrase. Moreover, 
as far back as 1870, the Supreme Court has held that purely intra-
contracts of employment which could be covered by the FAA would be those of 
transportation workers.” Id. This Note does not argue that any of the Supreme Court’s prior 
arbitration jurisprudence was wrongly decided, so it takes the conclusion that “engaged 
in . . . commerce” is narrower than “affecting . . . commerce” or “involving commerce” as 
given.
192. See supra Section II.A.3.
193. See Brief of the Ass’n of Trial Lawyers of America as Amici Curiae in Support of the 
Respondent at 5, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (No. 99-1379) 
[hereinafter Brief of Ass’n of Trial Lawyers] (explaining that “several dozen” federal laws 
that use the term “engaged in commerce” and many others using the term “in commerce”
“have been construed to apply to the entire stream of commerce, from the production of 
goods or services which pass through interstate channels until their distribution”). Recently, 
both the First Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have canvassed many of the same historical stat-
utes discussed in the subsequent pages of this Note, concluding that the exemption encom-
passed delivery drivers that were in the stream of commerce even though the drivers only 
moved intrastate. See Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., 966 F.3d 10, 18–26 (1st Cir. 2020);
Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904, 909–15 (9th Cir. 2020).
194. See 15 U.S.C. § 13 (“It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in com-
merce . . . .”), § 18 (“No person engaged in commerce . . . .”).
195. United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 283 (1975) (quoting Gulf 
Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974)). The Court has applied similar in-
terpretations to the Federal Trade Commission Act (also passed in 1914) and the Lanham 
Act (passed in 1946), among others. See Brief of Ass’n of Trial Lawyers, supra note 193, at 
6–8.
196. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 115–17. The Supreme Court also endorsed the flow of 
commerce understanding of the exemption in Allied-Bruce. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. 
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273 (1995) (holding that the words “involving commerce” are broad-
er than simply activities in the flow of commerce) (citing United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint.
Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 276 (1975)).
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state trips are in the flow of commerce as long as they are a com-
ponent part of an interstate movement.197
Even early Supreme Court cases interpreting the Federal Em-
ployers Liability Act of 1908 (FELA), which is specific to the trans-
portation industry, did not require that workers move across state 
lines. That Act makes “every common carrier by railroad while en-
gaging in commerce . . . liable in damages to any person suffering in-
jury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce.”198
The Court held that the statute covered, for example, a repairman 
on a bridge regularly used in interstate transportation199 and a yard 
worker who inspected trains moving in interstate commerce.200 Be-
cause these workers were related to interstate travel without ever 
themselves physically moving across state lines, the conception of 
“engaging” in interstate commerce adopted in these cases was 
broader than the conception now used by the majority of lower 
courts interpreting the FAA.201
Thus, the term “engaged in . . . commerce” should not impose 
the requirement that rideshare drivers must move across state lines 
to qualify for the exemption, but rather should encompass the en-
tire stream of commerce. Rideshare drivers, as a class, are a com-
ponent part of the flow of commerce because they frequently drive 
passengers to and from airports, railroad stations, bus stations, and 
other points of interstate travel.202 In fact, rideshare drivers are like 
the last-mile delivery truck drivers—they mostly travel intrastate,
but are a component part of the passenger’s interstate travel (ei-
197. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 565 (1870) (holding that a ship that trav-
eled entirely intrastate but that carried goods intended for, and imported from, other states 
was “engaged in commerce between the States”).
198. 45 U.S.C. § 51. Because the FELA’s statutory language is almost identical to the 
FAA’s, Congress probably had the FELA in mind when drafting the FAA. See Tenney Eng’g, 
Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., 207 F.2d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 1953); 
Waithaka, 966 F.3d at 19. Moreover, when interpreting the FELA after its enactment, courts 
needed to determine both whether the railroad-employer was engaged in interstate com-
merce and whether the injured employee was engaged in interstate commerce. See Mondou 
v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 51–52 (1912) (“The present 
act . . . deals only with the liability of a carrier engaged in interstate commerce for injuries 
sustained by its employees while engaged in such commerce.”). The second prong of this 
inquiry—focusing on the injured employee—overlaps with the FAA’s emphasis on workers 
engaged in interstate commerce thereby making the early FELA cases relevant in the FAA 
context. Waithaka, 966 F.3d at 19–20.
199. Pederson v. Del. Lackawanna, & W. R.R. Co., 229 U.S. 146, 153 (1913).
200. St. Louis, S.F. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Seale, 229 U.S. 156, 161 (1913).
201. See supra Section II.A.3 (explaining that most lower courts require that the worker 
move across state lines to qualify for the exemption).
202. For example, in 2019, rideshare platforms provided approximately eight million 
rideshare trips to or from Logan Airport in Boston. Rides to or from the airport comprised 
about sixteen percent of the total rides with rideshare companies in the Boston area and 
about nine percent of rides in all of Massachusetts. Rideshare in Massachusetts: 2019 Data Re-
port, MASS.GOV, https://tnc.sites.digital.mass.gov/#footnotemsg3 [https://perma.cc/DN4F-
BBS3] (last visited Nov. 10, 2020).
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ther at the beginning of the trip or the end) and are therefore in 
the stream of interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court has held that purely local passenger trans-
portation can be in the flow of commerce in other contexts. For 
example, in United States v. Capital Transit Co., the Court held that 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) could regulate the fares 
of a bus line that carried passengers purely within the District of 
Columbia.203 The Court reasoned that the bus line’s operations 
were “an integral part of interstate movement” because govern-
ment workers who lived in the District used the bus line either at 
the beginning or end of their travel to and from work in Virginia.204
Furthermore, flow of commerce jurisprudence has rejected ef-
forts to isolate purely local rides when those rides are in the stream 
of interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has explained that:
The fact that several different and independent agencies 
are employed in transporting the commodity, some acting 
entirely in one State, and some acting through two or more
States, does in no respect affect the character of the trans-
action. To the extent in which each agency acts in that 
transportation, it is subject to the regulation of Congress.205
Also, the FELA cases recognized that the stream of commerce 
could not be broken down into component parts.206 Thus, the flow 
of commerce includes all the modes of transportation that com-
bine to create interstate movement, even if those modes are purely 
intrastate.
Recently, some lower courts have reasoned that intrastate trips 
using ridesharing platforms to and from airports and other points 
of interstate travel were not in the flow of commerce by pointing to 
203. The Supreme Court heard two cases involving the ICC’s jurisdiction over Capital 
Transit. See United States v. Capital Transit Co., 325 U.S. 357 (1945) [hereinafter Capital 
Transit I]; United States v. Capital Transit Co., 338 U.S. 286 (1949) (per curiam) [hereinaf-
ter Capital Transit II]. Initially, Capital Transit operated an intra-District of Columbia bus 
and streetcar route, which dropped passengers off at a bus stop in the central business dis-
trict and was also one of four bus companies to offer passage from the District of Columbia 
to Virginia from that bus station. Capital Transit I, 325 U.S. at 359. After the Supreme Court 
upheld the ICC’s jurisdiction under this arrangement, Capital Transit stopped operating the 
interstate route. See Capital Transit II, 388 U.S. at 288–89. But, in the second case, the Court 
found that the change, which meant that Capital Transit only operated purely intrastate 
routes, did not take the bus company’s operations out of the stream of commerce. See id. at 
290.
204. Capital Transit II, 388 U.S. at 290.
205. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 565 (1870).
206. See Pederson v. Del. Lackawanna, & W. R.R. Co., 229 U.S. 146, 151–52 (1913) (re-
jecting an argument that “proceeds upon the assumption that interstate commerce by rail-
road can be separated into several elements, and the nature of each determined regardless 
of its relation to others”); see also Finkin, supra note 6, at 294 n.55.
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the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Yellow Cab, Co.207 In 
that case, decided in 1947, the Court held that transportation be-
tween two rail stations in Chicago was in the flow of commerce and 
covered under the Sherman Act, but taxicab transportation from 
hotels, businesses, and residences to rail stations was not in the 
flow of commerce.208 Even at the time, however, this strict bounda-
ry separating intrastate movement between rail stations and intra-
state movement to rail stations was arbitrary and lacked any coher-
ent principle.209
Lower courts have drawn even more arbitrary lines. Some courts 
have held that taxi companies that offer pre-scheduled trips to the 
airport are in the flow of commerce, while others have held that 
companies that have a special arrangement with an airport, rail-
road station, or other mode of interstate travel are in interstate 
commerce.210 When applied to rideshare drivers, this line of rea-
soning does not hold up because rideshare platforms can meet all 
of these distinctions. Indeed, it would be an impossible task for
courts to inquire as to how many Uber rides are between railroad 
stations and airports, or how many Uber rides to the airport are 
pre-scheduled. And the task is further complicated by the fact that 
the FAA requires courts to analyze the class of workers to which the 
worker belongs, rather than the worker as an individual.211
Finally, there is room to expand the exemption beyond its cur-
rent scope without making its reach coextensive with the full reach 
of Congress’s commerce power. The category of workers that “af-
fect” interstate commerce is much different than those workers 
who are in the flow of commerce.212 Certain back-office employees 
207. See Rogers v. Lyft, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 3d 904, 917 (N.D. Cal. 2020); Capriole v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., 460 F. Supp. 3d 919, 931–32 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
208. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 228–34 (1947), overruled on other 
grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
209. See John A. Yeager, Antitrust Law—“Incidental Effect” and Jurisdiction Under the Sherman 
Act, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 965 (1975) (arguing that the Yellow Cab Court “arbitrarily” placed a 
boundary on the flow of commerce); Milton A. Kallis, Local Conduct and the Sherman Act,
1959 DUKE L.J. 236, 251–53 (explaining that the Yellow Cab Court “failed completely to ana-
lyze all of the issues,” making the decision “of uncertain meaning and questionable sound-
ness”).
210. See, e.g., Exec. Town & Country Servs., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 789 F.2d 1523, 1525–
26 (11th Cir. 1986); Packard v. Pittsburgh Transp. Co., 418 F.3d 246, 256–58 (3d Cir. 2005).
211. Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., 939 F.3d 210, 226 (3d Cir. 2019) (remanding the case to 
the district court to determine whether the plaintiff belongs to a class of workers engaged in 
interstate commerce).
212. For example, courts have held that when a good or passenger comes to rest, it is no 
longer in the flow of commerce. See supra text accompanying notes 125–27. Yet even an ob-
ject or action that is completely “at rest,” and therefore not in the flow of commerce, can 
still “affect” commerce. See Kevin S. Anderson, The Confusing World of Interstate Commerce and 
Jurisdiction Under the Sherman Act – A Look at the Development and Future of the Currently Deployed 
Jurisdictional Tests, 21 VILL. L. REV. 721, 733 (1976).
558 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 54:2
at transportation companies may substantially affect commerce. 
But these employees are not also in the flow of commerce since, 
unlike the actual drivers at these companies, they do not actively 
participate in the stream of transportation that gets the passenger 
or goods from one point to another. Thus, the courts need not be 
worried about running afoul of Circuit City’s holding that only 
transportation workers are included in the exemption, because the 
flow of commerce understanding of the exemption would not 
reach back-office employees at transportation companies or work-
ers outside of the transportation context.213
D. Exclusion of Rideshare Drivers from the FAA as a Positive Policy 
Outcome
As a policy matter, rideshare drivers should be exempt from ar-
bitration because it can adversely affect workers and hinder regula-
tory schemes designed to protect their interests. To start, most 
employment contracts are contracts of adhesion, whereby employ-
ees have very little bargaining power to negotiate specific terms.214
Arbitration agreements in standard-form contracts rob the courts 
of their role in enforcing statutory rights.215 Indeed, the drafters of 
the FAA recognized that arbitration could be unfair in certain em-
ployment contracts where the parties do not have equal bargaining 
power. At the 1923 hearings on the proposed arbitration bill, Sena-
tor Walsh of Montana stated that:
The trouble about the matter is that a great many of these 
contracts that are entered into are really not voluntarily 
things at all . . . . You can take that or you can leave it . . . .
It is the same with a good many contracts of employment. A 
man says “These are our terms. All right, take it or leave it.”
Well, there is nothing for the man to do except to sign it; 
and then he surrenders his right to have his case tried by 
213. See supra Section II.A.3 (discussing the link between the requirement that the work-
er be in the transportation industry and their connection to interstate commerce).
214. Black’s Law Dictionary defines adhesion contracts as “standard-form contract[s] 
prepared by one party, to be signed by another party in a weaker position . . . who adheres 
to the contract with little choice about the terms.” Adhesion Contract, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
215. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 
1633 (2005).
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the court, and has to have it tried before tribunal in which 
he has no confidence at all.216
Some scholars have suggested that the drafters of the FAA never 
meant to include adhesion contracts within the scope of the Act 
because of the unequal bargaining power between the two par-
ties.217 At the very least, the drafter’s concerns should make courts 
more skeptical of enforcing arbitration clauses in situations where 
the bargaining power between the parties may be unequal, such as
standard employment contracts used by ridesharing platforms.
Furthermore, for rideshare drivers, arbitration often comes with 
class action waivers precluding workers from banding together to 
sue the company in arbitration. For example, Uber includes an ar-
bitration clause with a class action waiver in its employment con-
tracts.218 Mandating individual arbitration makes it more difficult 
for Uber’s employees to bring suit when the value of their individ-
ual claims are small.219 This effectively diminishes the opportunity 
for Uber drivers to use the public court system to hold Uber ac-
countable and enforce the law.220
Perhaps because of the inequities discussed above, arbitration 
may have harmful consequences in individual cases. Arbitrators 
may be biased towards companies, like Uber or Lyft, who appear 
frequently before them.221 Not surprisingly, employees fare much 
worse in arbitration than they do in litigation. Data from 2013 to 
216. 1923 Hearings at 9 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt). Julius Henry Cohen, another ABA 
member who was integral in advancing the FAA through Congress, expressed similar reser-
vations about adhesion contracts during Congressional hearings in 1924. See 1924 Hearings 
at 15 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen).
217. See Moses, supra note 146, at 107. Modern-day proponents of arbitration clauses in 
standard form contracts point out that these provisions often allow employees to opt out of 
the arbitration agreement and, further, that employees need not enter into the contracts at 
all. E.g., Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (with a Contractual-
ist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 201 (1998) (arguing that con-
sumers still enter into standard form contracts voluntarily). Indeed, Uber has discontinued 
its use of mandatory arbitration for its drivers—the company now allows its employees to 
opt-out of arbitration within thirty days of signing their contract with the ridesharing com-
pany. See Capriole v. Uber Techs., Inc., 460 F. Supp. 3d 919, 923–26 (N.D. Cal. 2020). But 
even allowing employees to opt out of the agreement ignores the practical reality of the sit-
uation. It is unrealistic to assume that an individual rideshare driver will even read the con-
tract he signs when he starts working for a ridesharing platform.
218. See Capriole, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 923–26 (explaining that Uber’s arbitration agree-
ment also includes a class action waiver).
219. See generally Jeremy McManus, Note, A Motion to Compel Changes to Federal Arbitration 
Law: How to Remedy the Abuses Consumers Face when Arbitrating Disputes, 37 B.C. J.L. & SOC.
JUST. 177, 180–81 (2017) (discussing the unfairness of mandatory individual arbitration in 
the consumer context).
220. Sternlight, supra note 215, at 1633.
221. See McManus, supra note 219; Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat 
Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL. J. 189, 208–13 (1997) (concluding that outcomes for 
employees are worse when the employer is a “repeat player” in arbitration).
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2017 from the American Arbitration Association shows that em-
ployees were awarded monetary damages in only 1.8% of arbitra-
tion cases.222 When employees do win, the monetary awards tend to 
be much lower than those given in litigation.223
These harmful byproducts of arbitration can also have a corro-
sive effect on federal regulatory schemes as a whole. In the em-
ployment context, litigation of individual disputes plays an im-
portant role in vindicating broader public policy goals.224
Remediation of individual wrongs allows a plaintiff to act as a “pri-
vate attorney general” by deterring potential wrongdoers, educat-
ing the public about their rights and obligations, creating prece-
dent and developing uniform law, and shaping public values.225
Private arbitration of disputes mitigates the effectiveness of indi-
vidual litigation in three ways. First, arbitration is often confiden-
tial, meaning that only the parties to the dispute are aware of the
ultimate outcomes.226 This secrecy hampers general deterrence 
goals and does little to educate the public about the law.227 Second, 
and relatedly, the development of precedent is hampered because 
arbitrators do not formulate legal rules and obligations applicable 
to other parties or the public as a whole.228 Finally, public adjudica-
tion “imparts a sense of right and wrong, of acceptable and unac-
ceptable conduct” in a way that private arbitration simply cannot.229
Thus, arbitration between ridesharing companies and their drivers 
harms the individual workers involved, and can have broader nega-
tive effects on the public justice systems upon which statutory em-
ployment regulation schemes depend.
222. Alexia Fernández Campbell & Alvin Chang, There’s a Good Chance You’ve Waived the 
Right to Sue Your Boss, VOX (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/8/1/16992362/
sexual-harassment-mandatory-arbitration [https://perma.cc/8HYE-XV4S].
223. Alexander Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and 
Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 7 (finding that median awards in employment litiga-
tion are around five to ten times greater than median awards in employment arbitration).
224. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law,
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 422 (1999) (“The achievement of the public goal depends upon 
the success of individuals in redressing their injury. And the individual’s interest in remedia-
tion gains legitimacy and support from the public policy goals of the statutes.”).
225. Id. at 426–27; see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Pri-
vate Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 261 (1979) (arguing that the court system plays a critical 
role in formulating rules with future effect and that this function is stifled by private dispute 
resolution).
226. Moohr, supra note 224, at 431.
227. Id. at 432.
228. Id. at 435.
229. Id. at 438; see also Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984)
(explaining that adjudication of disputes “explicates and gives force to the values embodied 
in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes”).
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CONCLUSION
The FAA, as originally enacted, was a procedural statute appli-
cable only in federal court. As the jurisprudence interpreting the 
FAA evolved, the scope of law widened. To accommodate this wid-
ening, courts have narrowly interpreted the section 1 exemption to 
only include those who (1) work in the transportation industry, (2) 
move goods, and (3) physically move across state lines. This inter-
pretation excludes rideshare drivers who bring suit against their 
employers. The narrow conception of the exemption is incon-
sistent with the legislative history of the FAA, inapposite to the his-
torical understanding of its text, and violative of the public policy 
reasons for statutorily regulating labor relationships. Courts should 
instead interpret the exemption to be congruent with the text and 
history of the FAA. This interpretation would include passenger 
centric drivers who are in the flow of commerce within the scope 
of section 1, exempting rideshare drivers from the FAA.

